In Louisiana v. Callais, the Supreme Court had to resolve an apparent tension between the 14th Amendment and the Voting Rights Act, which enforces the protections of the 15th Amendment.
The 15th Amendment to the United States Constitution, enacted after the Civil War, provides that “the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
The 15th Amendment also gives Congress the power to enforce its protections by appropriate legislation. Under the 15th Amendment’s enforcement power, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act, which provides that “no voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”
In order to challenge a law or voting map as violating the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court has explained that “the provision requires consideration of the totality of circumstances in each case and demands proof that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a protected class in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”
In the 1986 case of Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court set forth a four-part test for determining whether there was a violation of the Voting Rights Act. As the court explained the test in Louisiana v. Callais, “First, the plaintiff must show that the minority group in question is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district … Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive. Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate. Finally, a plaintiff who demonstrates the three preconditions must also show, based on the totality of circumstances, that the political process is not equally open to minority voters.”
In Louisiana v. Callais, a federal district court held that Louisiana’s congressional maps, which contained five majority-white voting districts and one majority-black voting district, violated the Voting Rights Act for not containing an additional majority-black congressional district. After Louisiana created a new map to provide for such a district, another federal district court held that the new map violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment by making a racial classification.
The 14th Amendment provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Under the Equal Protection Clause, legal classifications are subject to three different standards of judicial review, depending on the basis of the classification.
In general, when the government makes classifications based on non-constitutionally protected classes, such as age, the law will be upheld under “rational-basis scrutiny” as long as it is rationally related to advancing a legitimate governmental interest. Under the second level of judicial review, known as “intermediate scrutiny,” a classification on the basis of sex is constitutional only if it is substantially related to advancing an important governmental interest. Under the highest level of judicial review, called “strict scrutiny,” a classification on the basis of race, religion and national origin is constitutional only if it is narrowly-tailored towards advancing a compelling governmental interest.
In Callais, the Supreme Court first had to determine whether the challengers to Louisiana’s original map established a violation of the Voting Rights Act, and then determine whether the new map, which the legislature created by taking race into account, passed strict scrutiny under the 14th Amendment.
The Supreme Court held that because the Voting Rights Act enforces the protections of the 15th Amendment, and because the 15th Amendment prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of race, a violation of the Voting Rights Act under the “totality of the circumstances” prong of the Gingles test can be established only where the challengers demonstrate intentional racial discrimination, which was absent in the challenge to Louisiana’s original congressional map, which the record showed was aimed at protecting partisan political advantages, a constitutionally-permissible goal, as opposed to racial discrimination, an unconstitutional objective.
The Supreme Court held that even though complying with the Voting Rights Act was a compelling governmental interest under the strict scrutiny test, the revised maps in the present case violated the 14th Amendment because the Voting Rights Act did not require the state to create the new map based on race. Because the original map did not violate the Voting Rights Act in the first place, the re-drawn map was not necessary for compliance with the Voting Rights Act. Because the new map was not necessary, even though complying with the Voting Rights Act is a compelling governmental interest, such an interest did not apply in the specific case.